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Abstract
There has been a strong recent interest in applying quantum theory (QT) outside physics, including in cognitive science. We
analyze the applicability of QT to two basic properties in opinion polling. The first property (response replicability) is that, for
a large class of questions, a response to a given question is expected to be repeated if the question is posed again,
irrespective of whether another question is asked and answered in between. The second property (question order effect) is
that the response probabilities frequently depend on the order in which the questions are asked. Whenever these two
properties occur together, it poses a problem for QT. The conventional QT with Hermitian operators can handle response
replicability, but only in the way incompatible with the question order effect. In the generalization of QT known as theory of
positive-operator-valued measures (POVMs), in order to account for response replicability, the POVMs involved must be
conventional operators. Although these problems are not unique to QT and also challenge conventional cognitive theories,
they stand out as important unresolved problems for the application of QT to cognition. Either some new principles are
needed to determine the bounds of applicability of QT to cognition, or quantum formalisms more general than POVMs are
needed.
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Introduction
Quantum theory (QT) is the mathematical formalism of
quantum physics. (Sometimes the two are considered synonymous,
in which case what we call here QT would have to be called
‘‘mathematical formalism of QT.’’) However, QT has recently
begun to be used in various domains outside of physics, in biology,
economics, and cognitive science (see Text S1 Representative
Bibliography). For overviews, see the recently published mono-
graphs [1] and [2], as well as the recent target article in Brain and
Behavioral Sciences [3] with ensuing commentaries and rejoinders.
There is one obvious similarity between cognitive science and
quantum physics: both deal with observations that are fundamen-
tally probabilistic. This similarity makes the use of QT in cognitive
science plausible, as QT is specifically designed to deal with
random variables. Here, we analyze the applicability of QT in
opinion-polling, and compare it to psychophysical judgments.
On a very general level, QT accounts for the probability
distributions of measurement results using two kinds of entities,
called observables A and states y (of the system on which the
measurements are made). Let us assume that measurements are
performed in a series of consecutive trials numbered 1,2, . . .. In
each trial t the experimenter decides what measurement to make
(e.g., what question to ask), and this amounts to choosing an
observable A. Despite its name, the latter is not observable per se,
in the colloquial sense of the word, but it is associated with a
certain set of values u Að Þ, which are the possible results one can
observe by measuring A. In a psychological experiment these are
the responses that a participant is allowed to give, such as Yes and
No.
The probabilities of these outcomes in trial t (conditioned on all
the previous measurements and their outcomes) are computed as
some function of the observable A and of the state y tð Þ in which
the system (a particle in quantum physics, or a participant in
psychology) is at the beginning of trial t,
Pr u Að Þ~u in trial tDmeasurements in trials 1, . . . ,t{1½ 
~F y tð Þ, A, u
 
:
ð1Þ
This measurement changes the state of the system, so that at the
end of trial t the state is y tz1ð Þ, generally different from y tð Þ. The
change y tð Þ?y tz1ð Þ depends on the observable A, the state y tð Þ,
and the value u Að Þ observed in trial t,
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 10 | e110909
y tz1ð Þ~G y tð Þ, A, u
 
: ð2Þ
On this level of generality, a psychologist will easily recognize in
(1)–(2) a probabilistic version of the time-honored Stimulus-
Organism-Response (S-O-R) scheme for explaining behavior [4].
This scheme involves stimuli (corresponding to A), responses
(corresponding to u), and internal states (corresponding to y). It
does not matter whether one simply identifies A with a stimulus, or
interprets A as a kind of internal representation thereof, while
interpreting the stimulus itself as part of the measurement
procedure (together with the instructions and experimental set-
up, that are usually fixed for the entire sequence of trials). What is
important is that the stimulus determines the observable A
uniquely, so that if the same stimulus is presented in two different
trials t and t’, one can assume that A is the same in both of them.
The state y tz1ð Þ determined by (2) may remain unchanged
between the response u terminating trial t and the presentation of
(the stimulus corresponding to) the new observable that initiates
trial tz1. In some applications this interval can indeed be
negligibly small or even zero, but if it is not, one has to allow for
the evolution of y tz1ð Þ within it. In QT, the ‘‘pure’’ evolution of
the state (assuming no intervening inter-trial inputs) is described by
some function
y
tz1ð Þ
D ~H y
tz1ð Þ, D
 
, ð3Þ
where D is the time interval between the recording of u in trial t
and the observable in trial tz1. This scheme is somewhat
simplistic: one could allow H to depend, in addition to the time
interval D, on the observable A and the outcome u in trial t. We do
not consider such complex inter-trial dynamics schemes in this
paper.
The reason we single out opinion-polling and compare it to
psychophyscis is that they exemplify two very different types of
stimulus-response relations.
In a typical opinion-polling experiment, a group of participants
is asked one question at a time, e.g., a= ‘‘Is Bill Clinton honest
and trustworthy?’’ and b= ‘‘Is Al Gore honest and trustworthy?’’
[5]. The two questions, obviously, differ from each other in many
respects, none of which has anything to do with their content: the
words ‘‘Clinton’’ and ‘‘Gore’’ sound different, and the participants
know many aspects in which Clinton and Gore differ, besides their
honesty or dishonesty. Therefore, if a question, say, b, were
presented to a participant more than once, she would normally
recognize that it had already been asked, which in turn would
compel her to repeat it, unless she wants to contradict herself. One
can think of situations when the respondent can change her
opinion, e.g., if another question posed between two replications of
the question provides new information or reminds something
forgotten. Thus, if the answer to the question a= ‘‘Do you want to
eat this chocolate bar?’’ is Yes, and the second question is b= ‘‘Do
you want to lose weight?,’’ the replications of a may very well elicit
response No. It is even conceivable that if one simply repeats the
chocolate question twice, the person will change her mind, as she
may think the replication of the question is intended to make her
‘‘think again.’’ In a wide class of situations, however, changing
one’s response would be highly unexpected and even bizarre (e.g.,
replace a in the example above with ‘‘Do you like chocolate?’’).
We assume that the pairs of questions asked, e.g., in Moore’s study
[5] are of this type.
In a typical psychophysical task, the stimuli used are identical in
all respects except for the property that a participant is asked to
judge. Consider a simple detection paradigm in which the
observer is presented one stimulus at a time, the stimulus being
either a (containing a signal to be detected) or b (the ‘‘empty’’
stimulus, in which the signal is absent). For instance, a may be a
tilted line segment, and b the same line segment but vertical, the
tilt (which is the signal to be detected) being too small for all
answers to be correct. Clearly, the participant in such an
experiment cannot first decide that the stimulus being presented
now has already been presented before, and that it has to be
judged to be a because so it was before.
With this distinction in mind, however, the formalism (1)–(2)–(3)
can be equally applied to both types of situations. In both cases a is
to be replaced with some observable A, and b with some
observable B (after which a and b per se can be forgotten). The
values of A and B are the possible responses one records. In the
psychophysical example, u Að Þ and u Bð Þ each can attain one of two
values: 1 = ‘‘I think the stimulus was tilted’’ or 0 = ‘‘I think the
stimulus was vertical’’. The psychophysical analysis consists in
identifying the hit-rate and false-alarm-rate functions (conditioned
on the previous stimuli and responses)
Pr u Að Þ~1 in trial tjmeasurements in trials 1, . . . ,t{1½ ~
F y tð Þ, A, 1
 
,
Pr u Bð Þ~1 in trial tjmeasurements in trials 1, . . . ,t{1½ ~
F y tð Þ, B, 1
 
:
ð4Þ
The learning (or sequential-effect) aspect of such analysis
consists in identifying the function
y tz1ð Þ~G y tð Þ, S, u
 
, S [ A, Bf g, u [ 0, 1f g, ð5Þ
combined with the ‘‘pure’’ inter-trial dynamics (3).
In the opinion-polling example (say, about Clinton’s and Gore’s
honesty), there are two hypothetical observables: A, corresponding
to the question a= ‘‘Is Bill Clinton honest?’’, and B, correspond-
ing to the question b= ‘‘Is Al Gore honest?’’, each observable
having two possible values, 0 = ‘‘Yes’’ and 1 = ‘‘No’’. The
analysis, formally, is precisely the same as above, except that one
no longer uses the terms ‘‘hits’’ and ‘‘false alarms’’ (because
‘‘honesty’’ is not a signal objectively present in one of the two
politicians and absent in another).
In quantum physics, a classical example falling within the same
formal scheme as the examples above is one involving measuring
the spin of a particle in a given direction. Let the experimenter
choose one of two possible directions, a or b (unit vectors in space
along which the experimenter sets a spin detector). If the particle is
a spin-1=2 one, such as an electron, then the spin for each direction
chosen can have one of two possible values, 1 = ‘‘up’’ or 0 =
‘‘down’’ (we need not discuss the physical meaning of these
designations). These 1 and 0 are then the possible values of the
observables A and B one associates with the two directions, and
the analysis again consists in identifying the functions F , G, and
H .
Quantum Models in Psychology
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Theory
1 A brief account of conventional QT (with
measurements of the first kind)
In QT, all entities operate in a Hilbert space, a vector space
endowed with the operation of scalar product. The components of
the vectors are complex numbers. We will assume that the Hilbert
spaces to be considered are n-dimensional (n§2), but the
generalization of all our considerations to infinite-dimensional
spaces is trivial. The scalar product of vectors y, w is
Sy, wT~
Xn
i~1
xiy

i , ð6Þ
where xi and yi are components of y and w, respectively, and the
star indicates complex conjugation: if c~azib, then c~a{ib.
The length of a vector w is defined as EwE~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Sw, wT
p
.
Any observable A in this n-dimensional version of QT is
represented by an n|n Hermitian matrix (or operator, the two
terms being treated as synonymous in a finite-dimensional Hilbert
space). This is a matrix with complex entries such that, for any
i, j [ 1, . . . , nf g, aij~aji. In particular, all diagonal entries of A
are real numbers. It is known from matrix algebra that any
Hermitian matrix can be uniquely decomposed as
A~
Xk
i~1
uiPi, kƒn, ð7Þ
where u1, . . . ,uk are pairwise distinct eigenvalues of A (all real
numbers), and Pi are eigenprojectors (n|n Hermitian matrices
whose eigenvalues are zeros and ones). All eigenprojectors are
positive semidefinite, i.e., for any nonzero vector x, SPix,xT§0,
and they sum to the identity matrix, P1z . . .zPk~I . For any
distinct i, j [ 1, . . . , kf g, the eigenprojectors satisfy the conditions
P2i~Pi (idempotency), PiPj~0 (orthogonality): ð8Þ
In QT, the distinct eigenvalues u1, . . . , uk are postulated to
form the set of all possible values u Að Þ. That is, as a result of
measuring A in any given trial one always observes one of the
values u1, . . . , uk. For simplicity (and because all our examples
involve binary outcomes), in this paper we will only deal with the
observables A that have two possible values u Að Þ, denoted 0 and 1.
This means that all our observables can be presented as A~P1,
and
P20~P0, P
2
1~P1, P0P1~0, P0zP1~I : ð9Þ
Each eigenvalue u (0 or 1) has its multiplicity 1ƒdvn. This is
the dimensionality of the eigenspace V associated with u, which is
the space spanning the d pairwise orthogonal eigenvectors
associated with u (i.e., the space of all linear combinations of
these eigenvectors). Multiplication of Pu by any vector x is the
orthogonal projection of this vector into V . If d~1, the eigenspace
V is the ray containing a unique unit-length eigenvector of A
corresponding to u. The eigenvalue 1{u has the multiplicity n{d,
the dimensionality of the eigenspace V\ which is orthogonal to V .
If both d~1 and n{d~1 (i.e., n~2), then A is said to have a
non-degenerate spectrum. In this paper we assume the spectra are
generally degenerate (n§2).
The eigenvalues 0,1 of A in a given trial generally cannot be
predicted, but one can predict the probabilities of their
occurrence. To compute these probabilities, QT uses the notion
of a state of the system. In any given trial the state is unique, and it
is represented by a unit length state vector y. (For simplicity, we
assume throughout the paper that the system is always in a pure
state. This restriction is not critical for our analysis.) If the system is
in a state y tð Þ in trial t, and the measurement is performed on the
observable A, the probabilities of the outcomes of this measure-
ment are given by
F y tð Þ, A, u
 
~Pr u Að Þ~u in trial tDmeasurements in trials 1, . . . , t{1½ 
~SPuy tð Þ,y tð ÞT~ Puy tð Þ


2
,
ð10Þ
where u~0,1. Note that these probabilities are conditioned on the
previous observables, in trials 1, . . . ,t{1, and their observed
values.
Given that the observed outcome in trial t is u, the state y tð Þ
changes into y tz1ð Þ according to
G y tð Þ, A, u
 
~Puy
tð Þ=EPuy tð ÞE~y tz1ð Þ: ð11Þ
This equation represents the von Neumann-Lu¨ders projection
postulate of QT. The denominator is nonzero because it is the
square root of Pr u Að Þ~u in trial t½ , and (11) is predicated on u
having been observed. The geometric meaning of G y tð Þ, A, u
 
is
that y tð Þ is orthogonally projected by Pu into the eigenspace V and
then normalized to unit length.
Finally, the inter-trial dynamics of the state vector in QT
(between u and the next observable, separated by interval D) is
represented by the unitary evolution formula
H y tz1ð Þ,D
 
~UDy
tz1ð Þ~y tz1ð ÞD : ð12Þ
Here, UD is a unitary matrix, defined by the property
U{1D ~U
{
D, where, U
{1
D is the matrix inverse
(U{1D UD~UDU
{1
D ~I ), and U
{
D is the conjugate transpose of
UD, obtained by transposing UD and replacing each entry xziy in
it with its complex conjugate x{iy. The unitary matrix UD should
also be made a function of inter-trial variations in the environment
(such as variations in overall noise level, or other participants’
responses) if they are non-negligible. The identity matrix I is a
unitary matrix: if UD~I , (12) describes no inter-trial dynamics,
with the state remaining the same through the interval D. Note
that the eigenvalue u itself does not enter the computations. This
justifies treating it as merely a label for the eigenprojectors and
eigenspaces (so instead of 0,1 we could use any other labels).
Remark 1. In Pauli’s terminology [6], measurements described
by (10)–(11)–(12) are called measurements of the first kind. The
main distinguishing feature of such measurements is that two
identical measurements ‘‘immediately following each other’’ (i.e.,
with UD~I ) produce identical results. In Section 5 we consider a
generalized formalism that include measurements of the first kind
Quantum Models in Psychology
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as a special case, but also covers a broad (arguably, most
important) subclass of what Pauli calls measurements of the second
kind (defined as all measurements not of the first kind, or not
necessarily of the first kind).
2 Measurement sequences, evolution (in)effectiveness,
and stability
In this section we introduce terminology and preliminary
considerations needed in the subsequent analysis. Throughout the
paper we will make use of the following way of describing
measurements performed in successive trials:
A1,u1,p1ð Þ? . . .? Ar,ur,prð Þ: ð13Þ
We call this a measurement sequence. Each triple in the sequence
consists of an observable A being measured, an outcome u recorded
(0 or 1), and its conditional probability p. The probability is
conditioned on the observables measured and the outcomes recorded
in the previous trials of the same measurement sequence. Thus,
p1~Pr u A1ð Þ~u1 in trial 1½ ,
p2~Pr u A2ð Þ~u2 in trial 2 j u A1ð Þ~u1 in trial 1½ ,
p3~Pr u A3ð Þ~u3 in trial 3 j u A1ð Þ~u1 in trial 1,½
and u A2ð Þ~u2 in trial 2,
. . .
ð14Þ
As we assume that the outcomes u1, u2, . . . in a measurement
sequence have been recorded, all probabilities p1, p2, . . . are
positive if the measurement sequence exists. Recall that the
observables A1, A2, . . . in a sequence are uniquely determined by
the measurement procedures applied, a1, a2, . . ., and that the
outcomes (0 or 1) are eigenvalues of these observables.
Consider now the two-trial measurement sequence
A,u,pð Þ? B,v,qð Þ, where u, v [ 0,1f g. Let A have the eigenpro-
jectors P0, P1, and B have the eigenprojectors Q0, Q1. If the initial
state of the system is y~y 1ð Þ, we have p~EPuyE2, and y 1ð Þ
transforms into y 2ð Þ~Puy=EPuyE. Assuming an interval D
between the two trials, y 2ð Þ evolves into y 2ð ÞD ~UDy
2ð Þ. This is
the state vector paired with B in the next measurement, yielding,
with the help of some algebra,
q~EQwy
2ð Þ
D E
2~E U{DQwUD
 
PuyE2=EPuyE2: ð15Þ
As a special case UD can be the identity matrix (no inter-trial
changes in the state vector), and then we have
q~EQwPuyE2=EPuyE2, ð16Þ
because in this case U
{
DQwUD
 
~Qw: It is possible, however, that
the latter equality holds even if U
{
D is not the identity matrix. In
fact it is easy to see that this happens if and only if UD and B
commute, i.e., UDB~BUD. For the proof of this, see Lemma 1 in
Text S2 Proofs. We will say that
Definition 1. A unitary operator UD is ineffective for an
observable B if the two operators commute, UDB~BUD.
The justification for this terminology should be transparent: due
to Lemma 1, in the computation (15) of the probability q the
evolution operator can be ignored, yielding (16). The notion of
inefficiency of the evolution operator will play an important role in
the analysis of repeated measurements below.
Our next consideration regards the set of all possible values of
the initial state vector y for a given measurement sequence. In the
applications of QT in physics, this set is assumed to cover the
entire Hilbert space in which they are defined. We are not justified
to adopt this assumption in psychology, it would be too strong: one
could argue that the initial states in a given experiment may be
forbidden to attain values within certain areas of the Hilbert space.
At the same time, it seems even less reasonable to allow for the
possibility that the initial state for a given measurement sequence is
always fixed at one particular value. The initial state vectors, as
follows from both the QT principles and common sense, should
depend on the system’s history prior to the given experiment, and
this should create some variability from one replication of this
experiment to another. This is important, because, given a set of
observables, specially chosen initial state vectors may exhibit
‘‘atypical’’ behaviors, those that would disappear if the state vector
were modified even slightly. It is known [7] that in physical systems
very close states may have very different physical properties. We
need therefore to confine our analysis to properties that, while they
may not hold for the entire Hilbert space, are stable with respect to
very small changes in the initial states for which they hold. This
leads us to adopting the following
Stability Principle. If y is a possible initial state vector for a
given measurement sequence in an n-dimensional Hilbert space,
then there is an open ball Br yð Þ centered at y with a sufficiently
small radius r, such that any vector yzd in this ball, normalized by
its length yzdk k, is also a possible initial state vector for this
measurement sequence.
Definition 2. A property of a measurement sequence is (or
holds) stable for an initial vector y, if it holds for all state vectors
within a sufficiently small Br yð Þ.
Almost all our propositions below are proved under this stability
clause, specifically by using the reasoning presented in Lemma 2 in
Text S2 Proofs.
Remark 2. In Ref. [7] closeness is defined in terms of a measure
called fidelity, which is different from the measure of closeness
used in our stability principle. It is easy to show, however, that our
measure topologically refines fidelity (i.e., any sequence of states
converging to a given state in the sense of our measure also
convergence to that state in the sense of fidelity).
3 Consequences for ‘‘aRa’’-type measurement
sequences
Using the definitions and the language just introduced, we will
now focus on the consequences of (10)–(11)–(12) for repeated
measurements with repeated responses,
A, u, pð Þ? A, u, p’ð Þ: ð17Þ
Consider an opinion-polling experiment, with questions like a=
‘‘Is Bill Clinton trustworthy?’’ [5]. As argued for in Introduction, if
the same question is posed twice, a?a, a typical respondent, who
perhaps hesitated when choosing the response the first time she
was asked a, would now certainly be expected to repeat it, perhaps
with some display of surprise at being asked the question she has
just answered. This may not be true for all possible questions, but
it is certainly true for a vast class thereof. Let us formulate this as
Quantum Models in Psychology
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Property 1. For some nonempty class of questions, if a question
is repeated twice in successive trials (separated by one of a broad
range of inter-trial intervals), the response to it will also be repeated.
Remark 3. Onemay be tempted to dismiss this property as readily
explained by the respondent’s ‘‘simply remembering’’ her previous
answers. As argued in Conclusion, however, the availability of such
common sense explanations is irrelevant for our analysis, as its
purpose is to determine if the phenomena we consider can be
explained in a unified mathematical language of QT.
If a question a within the scope of Property 1 is represented by
an observable A, we are dealing with the measurement sequence
(17) in which p’~1. Such a measurement sequence does not
disagree with the formulas (10)–(11)–(12). In fact it is even
predicted by them if the intervening inter-trial evolution of the
state vector is assumed to be ineffective. Indeed, (15) for the
measurement sequence (17) acquires the form
p’~E U{DPuUD
 
PuyE2=EPuyE2, ð18Þ
and the inefficiency of UD for A implies
p’~EP2uyE
2=EPuyE2~1, ð19Þ
because P2u~Pu holds for all projection operators. We remind the
reader that (10)–(11)–(12) define measurements of the first kind
(see Remark 1). Our consideration is confined to these measure-
ments until Section 5.
We see that ineffective evolution implies Property 1. As it turns
out, under the stability principle, this implication can be reversed:
effective inter-trial evolution is excluded for the observables
representing the questions falling within the scope of Property 1.
In other words, for all such questions, the unitary operators UD
can be ignored in all probability computations. Let us say that
Definition 3. An observable A has the Lu¨ders property with
respect to a state vector y if the existence of the measurement
A,u,pð Þ for this y and an outcome u [ 0,1f g implies that the
property p’~1 holds stable for this y in the measurement
sequence A,u,pð Þ? A,u,p’ð Þ.
In other words, the Lu¨ders property means that an answer to a
question (represented by A) is repeated if the question is repeated,
and that this is true not just for one initial state vector y, but for all
state vectors sufficiently close to it.
Remark 4. Note that for the ineffective evolution (including the
measurements that ‘‘immediately follow each other’’) the Lu¨ders
property holds for all possible state vectors y. This was taken by
Pauli [6] as the defining property of the measurements of the first
kind. As argued at the introduction of the stability principle in
Section 2, in psychology formulations involving ‘‘all possible initial
states’’ would be unjustifiably strong.
We now can formulate our first proposition.
Proposition 1. [repeated measurements] An observable A has
the Lu¨ders property if and only if UD in (12) is ineffective for A.
See Text S2 Proofs for a formal proof. In the formulation of
Property 1, the interval D and the question represented by A can
vary within some broad limits, whence the inefficiency of UD for A
should also hold for each of these intervals combined with each of
these questions.
We have to be careful not to overgeneralize the Lu¨ders property
and the ensuing inefficiency property. As we discussed in
Introduction, one can think of situations where replications of a
question may lead the respondent to ‘‘change her mind.’’ The
most striking contrast, however, is provided by psychophysical
applications of QT. Here, the inter-trial dynamics not only cannot
be ignored, it must play a central role.
Let us illustrate this on an old but very thorough study by
Atkinson, Carterette, and Kinchla [8]. In the experiments they
report, each stimulus consisted of two side-by-side identical fields
of luminance L, to one of which a small luminance increment DL
could be added, serving as the signal to be detected. There were
three stimuli:
a~ LzDL, Lð Þ, b~ L, LzDLð Þ, c~ L, Lð Þ: ð20Þ
In each trial the observer indicated which of the two fields, right
one or left one, contained the signal. There were thus two possible
responses: Left and Right. An application of QT analysis to these
experiments requires a, b, c to be translated into observable
A, B, C, each with two eigenvalues, say, 0~Left and 1~Right.
In the experiments we consider no feedback was given to the
observers following a response. This is a desirable feature. It makes
the sequence of trials we consider formally comparable to
successive measurements of spins in quantum physics: measure-
ments simply follow each other, with no interventions in between.
We are interested in measurement sequences
A,0,p1ð Þ? A,0,p10
 
, B,0,p3ð Þ? B,0,p30
 
, C,0,p5ð Þ? C,0,p50
 
A,1,p2ð Þ? A,1,p20
 
, B,1,p4ð Þ? B,1,p40
 
, C,1,p6ð Þ? C,1,p60
 
:
ð21Þ
Recall that the probabilities p’i (i~1, . . . ,6) are conditioned on
previous measurements, so that, e.g., p’1zp’2=1 while p1zp2~1.
For each observer, the probabilities were estimated from the last
400 trials out of 800 (to ensure an ‘‘asymptotic’’ level of
performance). The results of one of the experiments (with
equiprobable a and b), averaged over 24 observers, were as
follows:
A,0,:65ð Þ? A,0,:73ð Þ, B,0,:36ð Þ? B,0,:39ð Þ, C,0,:50ð Þ? C,0,:50ð Þ
A,1,:35ð Þ? A,1,:38ð Þ, B,1,:64ð Þ? B,1,:71ð Þ, C,1,:53ð Þ? C,1,:60ð Þ:
ð22Þ
In accordance with Proposition 1, we should conclude that the
inter-trial evolution (12) here intervenes always and significantly.
4 Consequences for ‘‘aRbRa’’-type measurement
sequences
Returning to the opinion polling experiments, consider the
situation involving two questions, such as a= ‘‘Is Bill Clinton
honest?’’ and b= ‘‘Is Al Gore honest?’’ The two questions are posed
in one of the two orders, a?b or b?a, to a large group of people.
The same as with asking the same question twice in a row, one
would normally consider it unnecessary to extend these sequences
by asking one of the two questions again, by repeating b or a after
having asked a and b. A typical respondent, again, will be expected
to repeat her first response. We find it ‘‘almost certain’’ (the
‘‘almost’’ being inserted here because we cannot refer to any
systematic experimental study of this obvious expectation) that from
the nonempty (in reality, vast) class of questions falling within the
scope of Property 1 one can always choose pairs of questions falling
Quantum Models in Psychology
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 October 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 10 | e110909
within the scope of the following extension of this property. (See
Remark 3.)
Property 2. Within a nonempty subclass of questions (and for
the same set of inter-trial intervals) for which Property 1 holds, if a
question a is asked following questions a and b (in either order), the
response to it will necessarily be the same as that given to the
question a the first time it was asked.
As always, we replace a, b with observables A, B, and use the
following notation: the probability of obtaining a value u when
measuring the observable A is denoted puA, quA, etc. (the letters
p,q, etc. distinguishing different measurements); we use analogous
notation for the probability of obtaining a value v when
measuring the observable B. Consider the measurement sequence
A,u,puAð Þ? B,v,pvBð Þ? A,u,p’uAð Þ ð23Þ
Property 2 implies that in these sequences p’uA~1 and q’vA~1.
As it turns out, this property has an important consequence
(assuming the two inter-trial intervals in the measurement
sequences belong to the same class as D in Proposition 1).
Proposition 2. [alternating measurements] Let A and B
possess the Lu¨ders property, and let the measurement sequences
A,u,puAð Þ? B,v,pvBð Þ exist for all u, v [ 0,1f g, and some initial
state vector y. Then, in the measurement sequences (23), the
property p’uA~1 holds stable for this y if and only if A and B
commute, AB = BA.
In other words, if the probabilities puA,pvB in
A,u,puAð Þ? B,v,pvBð Þ are nonzero for some y, the sequences
(23) exist with p’uA~1 for all state vectors in a small neighborhood
of y if and only if AB~BA. See Text S2 Proofs for a formal proof.
The commutativity of A and B is important because it has an
experimentally testable consequence.
Proposition 3. [no order effect] If A and B possessing the
Lu¨ders property commute, then in the measurement sequences
A,u,puAð Þ? B,v,pvBð Þ and B,v,qvBð Þ? A,u,quAð Þ, the joint prob-
abilities of the two outcomes are the same,
Pr u Að Þ~u in trial 1 and v Bð Þ~v in trial 2½ 
~Pr v Bð Þ~v in trial 1 and u Að Þ~u in trial 2½ :
ð24Þ
Consequently,
Pr u Að Þ~u in trial 1½ 
~Pr u Að Þ~u in trial 2½  and Pr v Bð Þ~v in trial 1½ 
~Pr v Bð Þ~v in trial 2½ :
ð25Þ
The proof of the proposition is given in Text S2 Proofs.
Equations (24)–(25) are empirically testable predictions. More-
over, if we assume that the questions like ‘‘Is Clinton honest’’ and
‘‘Is Gore honest’’ fall within the scope of Property 2 (and it would
be amazing if they did not), these predictions are known to be de
facto falsified.
Property 3. Within a nonempty subclass of questions for which
Property 2 holds (and for the same set of inter-trial intervals), the
joint probability of two successive responses depends on the order in
which the questions were posed.
This ‘‘question order effect’’ has in fact been presented as one for
whose understanding QT is especially useful: the empirical finding
that (24) fails is explained in Ref. [9] by assuming that A and B do
not commute. In the survey reported by Moore [5], about 1,000
people were asked two questions, one half of them in one order,
the other half in another. The results are presented for four pairs
of questions, in the form Pr u Að Þ~1 in trial 1½  versus
Pr u Að Þ~1 in trial 2½ , and analogously for B:
Pr u Að Þ~1 in trial 1½ , Pr u Að Þ~1 in trial 2½ ð Þ
~ :50,:57ð Þ, :41,:33ð Þ, :41,:53ð Þ, :64,:52ð Þ
Pr v Bð Þ~1 in trial 1½ , Pr v Bð Þ~1 in trial 2½ ð Þ
~ :68,:60ð Þ, :60,:64ð Þ, :46,:56ð Þ, :45,:33ð Þ
ð26Þ
As we can see, for all question pairs, the probability estimates of
Yes to the same question differ depending on whether the question
was asked first or second. Given the sample size (about 500
respondents per question pair in a given order) the differences are
not attributable to chance variation.
Properties 1, 2, and 3 turn out to be incompatible within the
framework of the conventional QT (with measurements only of
the first kind). We should conclude therefore that this formalism
cannot be applied to the questions that have these properties
without modifications.
5 Would POVMs work?
Are there more flexible versions (generalizations) of QT that
could be used instead?
One widely used generalization of the conventional QT involves
replacing the projection operators with positive-operator-valued
measures (POVMs), see, e.g., Refs. [10,11]. POVMs may but do
not have to conform with (10)–(11)–(12). The generalized theory
therefore involves measurements of both first and second kind.
The conceptual set-up here is as follows. We continue to deal
with an n-dimensional Hilbert space (n§2). The notion of a state
represented by a unit vector y in this space remains unchanged.
The generalization occurs in the notion of an observable. For
experiments with binary outcomes, an observable A of the
conventional QT is defined by A~P1, with eigenprojectors
P0,P1ð Þ and eigenvalues 0,1ð Þ. The eigenvalues themselves are not
relevant insofar as they are distinct: replacing 0,1 with another
pair of distinct values amounts to trivial relabeling of the
measurement outcomes. The information about the observable
A therefore is contained in the eigenprojectors P0, P1. They are
Hermitian positive semidefinite operators subject to the restric-
tions (9).
A generalized observable, or POVM, A (continuing to consider
only binary outcomes) is defined as a pair E0,E1ð Þ of Hermitian
positive semidefinite operators in the n-dimensional Hilbert space,
summing to the identity matrix I. In other words, the generaliza-
tion from eigenprojectors Pu to POVM components Eu amounts
to dropping the idempotency and orthogonality constraints,
defined in (8).
Any component Eu (u~0,1) can be presented as M
{
uMu, where
Mu is some matrix and M
{
u is its conjugate transpose. The
representation Eu~M
{
uMu for a given Eu is not unique, but it is
supposed to be fixed within a given experiment (i.e., for a given
measurement procedure).
The measurement formulas specifying F and G in (1)–(2) can
now be formulated to resemble (10)–(11). The conditional
probability of an outcome u~0,1 of the measurement of
A~ E0,E1ð Þ in state y tð Þ is
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F y tð Þ,A,u
 
~Pr u Að Þ~u in trial tDmeasurements in trials 1, . . . ,t{1½ 
~SEuy tð Þ,y tð ÞT~EMuy tð ÞE2
ð27Þ
This measurement transforms y tð Þ into
G y tð Þ,A,u
 
~Muy
tð Þ=EMuy tð ÞE~y tz1ð Þ: ð28Þ
The formula for the evolution of the state vector between trials
remains the same as for the conventional observables, (12).
It is easy to see that we no longer need to involve inter-trial
changes in the state vector to explain the fact that, in
psychophysics, a replication of stimulus does not lead to the
replication of response. In a measurement sequence
A,u,pð Þ? A,u,p’ð Þ, if UD is the identity matrix, then p’ is given
by SE2u y,yT=SEuy,yT. This value is generally different from 1,
because E2u , not necessarily an orthogonal projector, is generally
different from Eu.
This is interesting, as it suggests the possibility of treating
psychophysical judgments and opinion polling within the same
(evolution-free) framework. This encouraging possibility, however,
cannot be realized: the theory of POVMs cannot help us in
reconciling Properties 2 and 3 in opinion-polling, because POVMs
with Lu¨ders property cannot be anything but conventional
observables. This is shown in the following.
Proposition 4. [no generalization] A POVM A~ E0,E1ð Þ has
the Lu¨ders property with respect to a state y if and only if A is a
conventional observable (i.e., it is a Hermitian operator, and its
components E0,E1 are its eigenprojectors).
See Text S2 Proofs for a formal proof.
Proposition 4 says that POVMs to be used to model opinion
polling should be conventional observables, otherwise Property 1
will be necessarily contradicted. Put differently, the Lu¨ders
property effectively confines the measurements that can be
considered within the framework of POVMs to those of the first
kind. But then Propositions 1 and 2 are applicable, and they say
that the inter-trial dynamics is ineffective, and that all the
observables representing different questions within the scope of
Property 2 pairwise commute. This, in turn, allows us to invoke
Proposition 3, with the result that, contrary to Property 3, the
order of the questions should have no effect on the response
probabilities.
Remark 5. Not all measurements of the second kind can be
described by POVMs (see, e.g., the discussion of quantum
operations in Ch. 8 of Ref. [11]). One might argue that POVMs
represent most ‘‘typical’’ quantum measurements. It remains to be
seen, however, if other generalizations or modifications of QT
would lead to different results (see Conclusion).
Conclusions
Let us summarize. Both cognitive science and quantum physics
deal with fundamentally probabilistic input-output relations,
exhibiting a variety of sequential effects. Both deal with these
relations and effects by using, in some form or another, the notion
of an ‘‘internal state’’ of a system. In psychology, the maximally
general version is provided by the probabilistic generalization of
the old behaviorist S-O-R scheme: the probability of an output is a
function of the input and the system’s current state (function F in
(1)), and both the input and the output change the current state
into a new state (function G in (2)). If we discretize behavior into
subsequent trials, then we need also a function describing how the
state of the system changes between the trials (function H in (3)).
Quantum physics uses a special form of the functions F , G, and
H , the ones derived from (or constituting, depending on the
axiomatization) the principles of QT. Functions F and G are given
by (10)–(11) in the conventional QT, and by (27)–(28) in the QT
with POVMs, with the inter-trial evolution in both cases described
by (12). Nothing a priori precludes these special forms of F ,G,H
from being applicable in cognitive science, and such applications
were successfully tried: by appropriately choosing observables and
states, certain experimental data in human decision making were
found to conform with QT predictions [3].
As this paper shows, however, QT encounters difficulties in
accounting for some very basic empirical properties. In opinion
polling (more generally, in all psychological tasks where stimuli/
questions can be confidently identified by features other than those
being judged), there is a class of questions such that a repeated
question is answered in the same way as the first time it was asked.
This agrees with the Lu¨ders projection postulate, and renders the
use of both the inter-trial dynamics of the state vector and the
measurements of the second kind (at least those falling within the
framework of the POVM theory) unnecessary: to have this
property the questions asked have to be represented by
conventional observables with ineffective inter-trial dynamics. In
many situations, we also expect that for a certain class of questions
the response to two replications of a given question remains the
same even if we insert another question in between and have it
answered. This property can only be handled by QT if the
conventional observables representing different questions all
pairwise commute, i.e., can be assigned the same set of
eigenvectors. This, in turn, leads to a strong prediction: the joint
probability of two responses to two successive questions does not
depend on their order. This prediction is known to be violated for
some pairs of questions. The explanation of the ‘‘question order
effect’’ is in fact one of the most successful applications of QT in
psychology [9], but it requires noncommuting observables, and
these, as we have seen, cannot account for the repeated answers to
repeated questions.
Our paper in no way dismisses the applications of QT in
cognitive psychology, or diminishes their modeling value. It merely
sounds a cautionary note: it seems that we lack a deeper theoretical
foundation, a set of well-justified principles that would determine
where QT can and where it must not be used. We should also
point out that the problems identified in this paper are not unique
to QT. For example, random utility theories also have difficulty
explaining the trial to trial dependencies in answers to questions. If
we assume that a response is based on a randomly sampled utility
in each trial, then repeating the response will produce different
random samples in each trial. That is why in the experiments
designed to test random utility models questions never repeated
back to back, and instead ‘‘filler trials’’ are inserted to make
participants forget their earlier choice.
Clearly, the basic properties that we have shown to contravene
QT can be ‘‘explained away’’ by invoking considerations
formulated in traditional psychological terms. One can, e.g.,
dismiss the problem with repeated questions in opinion polling by
pointing out that the respondents ‘‘merely’’ remember their
previous answers and ‘‘simply’’ do not want to contradict
themselves. One can similarly dismiss the question order effect
by pointing out that the first question ‘‘simply’’ changes the
context for pondering the second question, e.g., reminds
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something the respondent would not have thought of had the
second question been asked first. These may very well be valid
considerations. But if one allows for such extraneous to QT
explanations, one needs to understand (A) why the same
extraneous considerations do not intervene in situations where
QT is successfully applicable, and (B) why one cannot stick to
considerations of this kind and dispense with QT altogether.
A reasonable answer is that the value of QT applications is
precisely in that it replaces the disparate conventional psycholog-
ical notions with unified and mathematically rigorous ones. But
then in those situations where we find QT not applicable one
needs more than invoking these conventional psychological
notions. One needs principles. Both in a psychophysical detection
experiment and in opinion polling, participants may think of
various things between trials, and previously presented stimuli/
questions as well as previously given responses definitely change
something in their mind, affecting their responses to subsequent
stimuli/questions. Why then the applicability of QT is not the
same in these two cases? Why, e.g., should the inter-trials
dynamics of the state vector (or the use of POVMs in place of
conventional observables) be critical in one case and ineffective (or
unnecessary) in another?
One should also consider the possibility that rather than acting
as switches distinguishing the situations in which (10)–(11) or (27)–
(28) are and are not applicable, the set of the hypothetical
principles in question may require a higher level of generality for
the functions F ,G,H. In Section 5 of Theory (see Remark 5) we
mentioned the existence of measurements of the second kind
falling outside the scope of POVMs. A serious and meticulous
work is needed therefore to determine precisely what features of
QT are critical for this or that (un)successful explanation. As an
example, virtually any functions F ,G,H in the general formulas
(1)–(2)–(3) predict the existence of the question order effect, and
the functions can always be adjusted to account for any specific
effect. The QQ constraint for the question order effect discovered
by Wang and Busemeyer [9] means that, for any two questions a,b
and any respective responses u, v [ 0,1f g,
hab u,vð Þ~
Pr u in response to a in trial 1, and v in response to b in trial 2½ 
~fab u,vð Þzgab u,vð Þ,
where fab u,vð Þ~fba v,uð Þ and gab u,vð Þ~{gab 1{u,1{vð Þ. It
follows then that
hab u,vð Þzhab 1{u,1{vð Þ~hba v,uð Þzhba 1{v,1{uð Þ,
which is the QQ equation. Clearly, F ,G,H functions in (1)–(2)–(3)
can be chosen so that fab and gab have the desired symmetry
properties, and the QT version of F and G used in Ref. [9] (with
ineffective H) is only one way of achieving this. It is an open
question whether one of many possible generalizations of this QT
version may turn out more profitable for dealing with opinion
polling.
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